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NOTES
factors, it seems to rest, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned,
upon the tacit assumption that a mere judgment creditor is not in a
position to invoke marshaling of assets. So long as the process is to
be confined to the relative privileges of specific lienholders, the re-
sult seems sound.
J. W. CREw, JR.
BANKER'S LIENS ON DEPOSITS SUBSEQUENT TO INDEBETEDNESS
The question arises in a recent Virginia case1 as to a bank's right
to set off a depositor's indebtedness to it against his balance on
simple account when the money deposited was of a fiduciary char-
acter, the bank having no notice or knowledge of this fact, and
when the debt had been created before this deposit. These funds
were the proceeds of a note collected by the depositor for the plain-
tiff, another bank, which now seeks to show its equities and defeat
the set-off. Held: Plaintiff bank cannot recover.
There is an absence of decision on this question in North Caro-
lina. The cases in other states are in conflict, the weight of author-
ity, however, being in accord with the principal case.
Where the depositary has knowledge that the money deposited
belonged to a third person,2 or where the circumstances are such as
to compel an inquiry3 as to the relation between the depositor and
the funds deposited, no set-off is allowed, on the equitable principle
that one who knows or should know that certain property belongs
to another cannot deal with it in such manner as to interfere with or
extinguish the other's rights thereto. Where, however, the deposi-
tary has extended credit or has in any other way changed its position
to its detriment in reliance upon the credit of the funds deposited
without notice of another's interest therein it is conceded that the
bank may retain as against the beneficial owner.4 This conclusion
is reached in some jurisdictions on the general grounds that where
Federal Reserve Bank v. State and City Bank, 143 S. E. 697 (Va., 1928).
'Central National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693
(1881) ; Union Stockyards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118,
26 L. Ed. 693 (1890); U. S. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504, 46.
Sup. Ct. 179, reversing decree in 287 F. 971 (C. C. A. N. Y., 1924).
'Union Stockyard Bank v. Moor et al, 79 F. 705, 25 C. C. A. 150 (1897).
'Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212, 12 L.
Ed. 409 (1847); Brady v. American National Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 Pac.
1006 (1926); South West Nat. Bank v. Evans, 94 Okla. 185, 221 Pac. 53
(1923).
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one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss should fall upon
the one who permitted the depositor to deal with the funds as his
own. In others it is held that the depositary becomes the holder in due
course for a valuable consideration.'
The character of the indebtedness against which the deposit bal-
ance is set off, has often been an influencing factor. Where it is an
overdraft, it is argued that it was in reliance upon the future deposits
in the general course of the business that the overdraft was allowed
to occur, and was intended to be liquidated as soon as sufficient
funds came into the hands of the bank.
It has been held that an express agreement with the bank that it
may apply deposits to the indebtedness gave the bank rights beyond
those flowing from the ordinary relation, and outside of the bank-
er's lien.5 And the fact that the depositor has consented to the
application of the funds to a particular debt has been held to be an
important factor, although to what extent it influenced the decision
the courts do not say. In McStay Supply Co. v. StoddardG the
court declared, "The bank has a lien upon all funds belonging to
depositor, deposited [italics ours] for any indebtedness owing to it by
the depositor." This statement brings up the question of whether
or not the deposit was made specifically to secure that indebtedness.7
Cases containing such distinguishing features as differences in type
of indebtedness, special agreements for security, consent to appli-
cation, etc., have been cited as authority for one another with a re-
sulting confusion which makes predictability difficult.
But it is in the absence of these factors that most dissension
occurs, and it is to such a case that the following discussion refers.
Various theories are advanced for the result reached in the instant
case. The one most generally accepted, however, is: That the rela-
tion between depositor and depositary is that of creditor and debtor,
the bank receiving full title to the funds deposited while the depositor
becomes merely a creditor of the bank for an equivalent amount of
money, and that a bank has a lien or right of set-off of any debt due
it by the depositor, against funds deposited.8
"' See Note 9.
'Hatch v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 147 N. Y. 184, 41 N. E. 403 (1895). The
inference is that upon the strength of the banker's lien alone the set-off may
not have been allowed.
McStay Supply Co. v. Stoddard, 35 Nev. 284, 132 Pac. 545 (1913).
Smith v. Des Moines Bank, 107 Iowa 624, 78 N. W. 238 (1899).
'Commercial National Bank v. Stockyards Loan Co., 16 F. (2d) 911
(C. C. A. 8th., 1926); Arnold v. Bank, 184 Cal. 632, 194 Pac. 1012, 13 A. L. R.,
p. 322 (1921).
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Another line of decisions rests upon the elementary proposition
that if a trustee uses trust money to pay an antecedent debt to a
creditor who has no notice that the money is subject to trust, the
money becomes free from the trust.9 In some jurisdictions, how-
ever, an antecedent debt was not, prior to the N. I. L., valuable
consideration. Section 259' of the N. I. L. has cured this difficulty.
But it may fairly be argued that a bank's off-set of a deposit which
a fiduciary depositor never intended to be applied to his individual
indebtedness is on a different .footing from a voluntary payment by
the trustee. To hold otherwise would seem tantamount to making
a trustee guilty of a breach of trust when there was no such intention
on his part and no act of his which was in the nature of a breach.
That is, of course, assuming that the deposit itself was not wrongful.
The cases contra' 0 seem to resent reaching a result so inequit-
able and ask the question why should a bank which has extended no
new credit or put itself in no more unfavorable position than before
the deposit was made, be allowed to retain funds in its possession
against the beneficial owner merely because it happened to have
possession and legal title at a time when it might sustain loss on
other debts due it from depositor? And, actually, why should it
receive protection at the expense of another when the original loss
was not occasioned by that other's acts. The other courts answer
"the banker's lien."
The banker's lien originated with the goldsmiths on Lombard
Street when banking was in its infancy and the coins deposited
were to be kept intact. Since then, it has been incorporated into the
law merchant and the common law to apply to modern credit-bank-
ing. Some states do not recognize it." The principle upon which it
seems to have been first sustained is that it is partly upon the faith
of f'oneys and securities coming into possession of the banker in the
'First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 102 Mo. App. 357, 76 S. W. 489
(1903) ; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY Jui. (3rd. ed.) §1048.
9" Negotiable Instruments, Brannan 4th Ed. §25. "Value is any consider-
ation sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing
debt constitutes value... .
" Shotvell v. Sioux Falls Bank, 34 S. D. 109, 147 N. W. 288, L. R. A.
1915A 715 (1914); Brady v. American Nat. Bank, supra note 4; Gibbs v.
Commercial and Say. Bank, 208 N. W. 779 (S. D., 1926); Nat. Bank v.
Insurance Co., supra note 2.
'Appeal of the Liggett Spring and Axle Co. Limited, 111 Pa. St. 291, 2
Atl. 685 (1886). "How a custom of this kind could obtain in the face of a
well established legal principle we cannot conceive, for an elementary con-
dition of a custom is that it be lawful, and without this it is vicious and void."
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future course of general dealings that credit is extended. 12 This
principle has persisted in spite of the modern requirement of specific
security for cash loans.
A loose use of the term banker's lien has resulted in much con-
fusion. In the case of a general deposit as contrasted with a pledge,
it is more accurate to use the term a right of set-off, since the title to
funds deposited is in the bank, and what remains to the depositor
is merely a chose in action. This right of set-off, as has been seen,
does not attach upon special deposits,13 or deposits with notice of
fiduciary character.' 4  Since the depositor retains only a claim
against the bank for an equivalent amount of money to that de-
posited, if the money was of fiduciary character, he holds this claim
in trust for the beneficiary.15 It is against this claim that the right
of set-off is exercised. Courts, however, have continued to say that
the bank has a lien on all funds deposited. 16
The question, therefore, narrows down to the limits beyond which
the so-called banker's lien or set-off should not be extended. It is
submitted that in the case where the bank has not changed its posi-
tion in reliance upon a deposit made by one in a fiduciary relation,
unknown to the bank, the minority view is more consistent with
modem commercial and banking practice, and fairer to all parties
concerned. 17
HARRY ROCKWELL.
"Russell v. Hadduck, 3 Gilman (Ill.), 233 (1846). "The true principle
upon which banker's liens must be sustained is there must be a credit given
upon the credit of the securities either in possession or expectance"; in re
Tallassee Mfg. Co., 64 Ala. 567 (1879); Jones on Liens, 261. "The collecting
bank cannot, however, maintain a lien if it has made no advance and given
no credit on account of paper received and collected."
Smith v. Bank. Supra note 7.
'Jones on Liens, 250; Gibbons v. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509, 63 N. W. 519
(1895).
P erry, TRUSTS, 6th ed., 122; 34 H. L. R. 468, 472.
" McStay v. Stoddard, supra note 6; Steere v. Stockyards Nat. Bank, 266
S. W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) ; First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, .supra
note 9; Smith v. Bank, supra note 7.
' Coburn v. Carstarphen, 194 N. C. 368, 139 S. E. 596 (1927). "A set-off
is in the nature of a payment or credit when debts are mutual. Set-off exists
in mutual debts independent of the statute of set-off. Its flexible character is
used in equity to prevent injustice." Dameron v. Carpenter, 190 N. C. 595,
130 S. E. 328 (1925). It is a matter of conjecture whether this attitude would
or would not prevail in a case similar to the principal one. The minority view
of the question under discussion seems to be the more consistent with the
principle here advanced by the court. See comment on Carstarphen case in
76 PA. L. Rxv. 314 (1928).
